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According to Nicholas Maxwell, two main problems of learning confront 
humanity: the problem of learning about the nature of the universe and our place in it, 
and the problem of learning how to achieve social progress toward a better, wiser world. 
The first problem, says Maxwell, was solved with the creation of modern science in the 
17th century. The second is still waiting to be solved. For Maxwell, philosophy has lost 
its track long ago, due to the neglect, or at least downplaying, of its fundamental role: to 
help us understand how the world as we experience it can exist and best flourish within 
the physical universe. This is ‘our fundamental problem’. Although some contemporary 
philosophers have explored aspects of this problem, such as Karl Popper, J.J.C. Smart, 
Thomas Nagel and David Chalmers, academic philosophy has failed so far to put that 
problem center stage (33). 
To tackle this problem, Maxwell puts forward a new kind of philosophical 
approach, which he calls ‘critical fundamentalism’. But the need to revolutionize 
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philosophy, says Maxwell, is only the starting point of a series of radical changes that 
must be implemented, namely, in the way we take science to tell us about the world 
(Chapters 3 and 5); in our conception of science and the kind of science we should seek 
to pursue (Chapter 4); in the interpretation of Darwin’s theory of evolution as a mean to 
understand how a life of value may have evolved (Chapter 6); and in the way the social 
sciences and academic inquiry ought to develop (Chapters 7 and 8). 
Maxwell’s book may be divided into three main parts, each one of them addressing 
a particular question. The first part concerns the question of how we can justify the 
autonomy of the ‘human world’ vis-à-vis the ‘physical universe’. This is the subject of 
Chapters 2 to 5. To answer this question, Maxwell addresses five approaches to the 
solution of the fundamental problem: physicalism, Cartesian dualism, idealism, naïve 
realism, and the two-aspect view, concluding with his support to a particular version of 
the latter, which he calls ‘experiential physicalism’. According to this view, the physical 
and the humanly experiential are just two kinds of features or properties of material 
things. In connection with this two-aspect view, Maxwell argues that Physics only covers 
the causally efficacious aspect of the world, and the manner in which that aspect 
determines, even if only probabilistically, the way events unfold. Consequently, Physics’ 
silence on the experiential aspects of reality provides no ground for rejecting the objective 
reality of perceptual qualities, not limited to the processes occurring in sentient or 
conscious brains, even though they can only be known by subjective means. In this 
context, Maxwell argues for a realist theory of perception, stressing the liabilities of the 
causal account of perception and its associated internalist viewpoint (49-54). To 
understand the human world is an enterprise quite distinct from explaining the physical 
universe, since it necessarily involves purposive explanations, not reducible to, although 
compatible with, physical explanations. 
The second part of the book addresses the question of how the human world could 
have been generated from a purely physical universe. That is the subject of Chapter 6. 
Maxwell thinks we can find an explanation if we embrace a purposive interpretation of 
Darwin’s theory of evolution. Although evolution itself has no purpose, mutations and 
natural selection are both devoid of any purpose, all living organisms are inherently 
purposive as their basic goals are to survive and reproduce. Now, purposive activity, 
manifested, for example, in niche construction, has “a major impact on selection — on 
what characteristics have survival value, and what do not — and thus on the way 





means’ can be understood as a new step or way of life, in the process of diversification, 
complexification, and sophistication of the purposeful activity of some living things. 
Darwin’s theory of evolution may thus explain why culture has evolved from non-cultural 
purposive actions, just like purposiveness gradually emerged from an ultimately 
purposeless universe. Although Darwin’s theory cannot explain the evolution of sentience 
and consciousness, it can give an account of what needs to evolve for them to emerge. 
For Maxwell, sentience, imagination and consciousness, all of them endowed with an 
undeniable survival value, may have emerged as a result of a series of gradual changes in 
the way brains control purposive action (143). 
The third part of the book examines the question of how the social sciences, 
academic inquiry and philosophy should be changed in order to address and solve the 
fundamental problem. This is the subject of Chapters 7-9 and the Appendix. According 
to Maxwell, the social sciences should not be primarily conceived as sciences, since their 
proper basic task must be to promote the cooperatively rational solving of conflicts and 
problems of living in the social world. Social inquiry should then be conceived as social 
methodology or philosophy rather than science. Global problems, such as growing 
inequality, global warming, pollution, destruction of natural habitats, conflicts and wars, 
are by-products of our scientific and technological successes (153 and 155). Now, if we 
do not want to “descend into even greater anarchy and chaos than what we have at 
present”, that is, if we really want to resolve these global problems, we need to learn how 
to best approach them. And this means “that our institutions of learning — or university 
and schools — need to be well designed and devoted to the task” (154). The reason why 
universities “are, in part, responsible for making things worse”, is that they adopted the 
traditional idea, rooted in the eighteen-century Enlightenment program, that the primary 
intellectual aim of inquiry is to acquire knowledge, and only secondarily to apply that 
knowledge to help solving social problems. 
This is why Maxwell calls for a new Enlightenment. We need to reverse the 
priorities: social inquiry and the humanities need to be at the heart of the academic 
enterprise. The standard empiricism, with its idea that scientific knowledge can be 
assessed independently of metaphysical issues, explains the current divorce between 
knowledge-inquiry and wisdom-inquiry, as well as the secondary character of the latter. 
Maxwell thus contends that our institutions, social endeavours and culture, need to adopt 





this way we can have “institutions of learning rationally designed and devoted to helping 
us improve our personal and social lives as we live” (178). 
Broadly speaking, Our Fundamental Problem develops two main theses. The first 
thesis says that philosophy must be able to learn how to solve the serious global problems 
of our times, which in turn implies an inversion of the traditional relations between 
knowledge-inquiry and wisdom-inquiry. The second thesis says that our inability to 
address adequately and solve the most important problems of our world is only, or mainly, 
due to the fact that, after Descartes, philosophy “has profoundly misunderstood what its 
proper task is”, as well as because the eighteen-century Enlightenment program was 
interpreted and developed in a wrong way (164-171; 206-210). 
Now, these two theses are quite independent of each other. One may entirely agree 
with the first while disagreeing with the second. For example, Maxwell rightly 
acknowledges that Spinoza endorsed a dual-aspect theory, thereby conceiving both mens 
and extensio as objective attributes of reality. Yet, Maxwell does not consider Spinoza’s 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and, in particular, his Ethics. Can one really say that all 
philosophers after Descartes failed to give center stage to what Maxwell considers to be 
the fundamental problem? (31-32) Secondly, I find it difficult to understand how post-
Cartesian philosophy and the development of Enlightenment program can be taken as the 
only or even main cause for our inability to address and solve problems such as the 
increasing growth of inequality, geopolitical conflicts and wars, or environmental 
degradation (164-165, 205-206). 
Nevertheless, the problems and challenges raised by Our Fundamental Problem are 
undoubtedly relevant, making this book a highly important contribution for anyone 
interested in addressing and answering the most important problems of our time in a 
meaningful way. It seems obvious that we cannot rely on mere palliative or cosmetic 
measures, nor in the passive belief that human rationality will inevitably solve all the 
problems somehow in the future as if it were teleologically guided by some intrinsic 
principle of optimization. For this reason, as well as for the fact that Maxwell takes 
problems such as the growth of inequality or environmental degradation very seriously, 
this book can be read as an essential counterpoint to other accounts such as the one 
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